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This paper analyzes the traditional unidimensional, two-party electoral competition game
when parties have mixed motivations, in the sense that they are interested in winning the elec-
tion, but also in the policy implemented after the contest. In spite of having discontinuous
payoﬀs, this game, refer to as the hybrid election game, is shown to be payoﬀ secure and recip-
rocally upper semi-continuous. Conditional payoﬀs, however, are not quasi-concave. Hence, the
existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (psne) is ensured only if parties have homogenous
interests in power. In that case, an equilibrium not only exists, but it is also unique. Instead, if
parties have heterogeneous motivations, depending upon the relationship between the electoral
uncertainty, the aggregate opportunism and its distribution across parties, a psne may or may
not exist. The mixed extension, however, is always better reply secure. Therefore, a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium do indeed exist. These results generalize previous existence results
in unidimensional electoral competition.
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Keywords: Electoral competition, mixed motivations, discontinuous games, Nash equilibrium.
1 Introduction
Electoral competition between political parties is probably one of the most common and important
features of every representative democracy. A large body of literature has been concerned with this
process.1 This paper contributes to that literature by analyzing existence and uniqueness of Nash
equilibrium in the traditional unidimensional, two-party political competition game when parties
have mixed motivations, in the sense that they are interested in winning the election, but also in
the policy implemented after the contest.
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1See, for instance, Roemer [27], Duggan [10] and Austen-Smith and Banks [3].
1Formal models of electoral competition originated in the famous location model of Hotelling [17].
In the simplest version of this model, two political parties or candidates simultaneously announce
a platform before the election, voters cast their votes, and the winner implements its announced
policy. The basic idea captured by this model is that, in a unidimensional (left-right) political
scale, each party can increase the number of votes by moving closer to the other party’s position.
Thus, if parties care only about the outcome of the election, which is the Downsian hypothesis,
and voters’ preferences admit the existence of a Condorcet winner, as it is the case when they
satisfy single-peakedness or single-crossing, then there is a unique Nash equilibrium in which both
parties propose the same policy (Hotelling [17], Downs [8]). The equilibrium platform is of course
the median of the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies (Hinich [15]). This result also holds
if there is uncertainty about individual preferences, provided that parties share a common prior
about the location of the median ideal point.2 However, in that case platforms converge to the
expected median (Calvert [6]).
Instead, if each party has an exogenous ideology, and cares only about how close the winning
policy is relative to its own ideological position, which is the Wittman’s [30] hypothesis, the con-
vergence to the median ideal policy holds only if there is no uncertainty about voters’ preferences
(Calvert [6], Roemer [25], Duggan and Fey [12]). Otherwise, under uncertainty, the game has a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium (psne), but equilibrium platforms do not converge (Roemer [26],
[27]).3 The reason for this is simple. As one party moves closer to the other, it becomes worse
oﬀ in the event that it wins, but at the same time it increases its chances of winning the contest.
Hence, parties face a trade-oﬀ between their ideology and winning the election, which results in an
equilibrium where their positions are diﬀerent.
Surprisingly, the existence of Nash equilibria in the hybrid case, where parties have preferences
over policies, but also on the oﬃce itself, has not received much attention in the literature. This
assumption, referred to as the mixed motivation assumption (mma), is certainly more realistic than
the previous hypotheses about parties’ motivations. For example, the mma naturally arises if pro-
fessional politicians are parties’ leaders.4 Since politicians may namely be interested in their career
and, therefore, in winning the election, while regular party members may care more about policy
outcomes, it is natural to expect that both objectives will enter into the party payoﬀ function with
some weight.5 Of course, these weights need not be the same across parties. Hence, heterogeneous
interests arise quite naturally as well.
To the best of my knowledge, Calvert [6] was the ﬁrst to show that, if parties have mixed
motivations and there is no uncertainty about the median ideal point, then there exists a unique
psne in which platforms converge to the median position, provided that parties’ ideal policies are
not on the same side of the median. Otherwise, the ideal point that is closest to the median is a
Nash equilibrium.
Although Calvert [6] did not address the issue of equilibrium existence under uncertainty, he
showed that, if motivations are homogenous across parties, in the sense that they assign the same
relative weight on holding oﬃce, “small departures” from the oﬃce motivation and certainty model
2See Bernhardt et al. [5] for a model with private pooling, where candidates receive private signals about voters’
preferences before committing to their policy platforms.
3Morton [22] provided experimental evidence which supports the fact that uncertainty over voters’ preferences is
a major determinant of platform divergence when candidates are ideological.
4See Ortu˜ no Ort´ ın [23] for a model in this line.
5Using experimental evidence about the probabilistic ideological election game, Morton [22] found that subjects
in the laboratory placed a weight of approximately 68% on the expected payoﬀs from policies and 32% on winning.
2lead to “small changes” in the results. Thus, the conclusion that is possible to draw from his
analysis is that in the limit, when the game is arbitrarily close to the Downsian game, (represented
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Figure 1: Electoral competition with homogeneous motives
But, what about equilibrium existence in other cases? As Figure 1 illustrates, even if we
maintain the assumption that parties’ motives are homogeneous, there are still regions in the
two-dimensional “Motivation-Information Box” (shown as the dotted line) where the existence of
electoral equilibria remains an open question. Needless to say that this is also the case if we add a
third dimension into the analysis, diﬀerentiating party 1’s motivations from those of party 2.
More importantly, it is worth noting that answering such questions is by no means a trivial
exercise, because the hybrid election game is an inﬁnite action game with discontinuous payoﬀs.
In eﬀect, it is well known in the literature on political competition under uncertainty that the
probability of winning the election is discontinuous on the diagonal. This in turns may preclude
the existence of best replies and, therefore, the best reply correspondence need not be nonempty
valued, let alone upper hemi-continuous.
Such a problem does not aﬀect the probabilistic Downsian electoral game (southeast corner of
the box), which always has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Moreover, it does not
aﬀect the probabilistic Wittman election game (northeast corner) either. As Roemer [26] showed,
purely ideological parties have continuous payoﬀs, in spite of the discontinuities of the probability
of winning function, so that best reply correspondences are always well deﬁned. However, it could
be a problem for the hybrid game.
The ﬁrst attempt to tackle this problem and ﬁnd out the implications of the mma for the
existence of Nash equilibria in electoral games with uncertainty was done by Ball [4].6 This paper
was the ﬁrst to correctly point out that the hybrid game may fail to possess a Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies. Moreover, it provided suﬃcient conditions for the existence of mixed strategy
6Before that, four papers studied candidates’ behavior with mixed motives. However, the ﬁrst one, due to Mitchell
[21], has the disadvantage that the ideological component of the payoﬀ function is given by the cost of departing from
the party’s ideological position, instead of by the expected utility over candidates’ proposals. The next two, due to
Wittman [30] and [31], wrongly assumed continuity of the probability of winning the election and quasi-concavity of
conditional payoﬀs, respectively, which are usually violated in the hybrid game. And, ﬁnally, Morton [22] analyzed
perfect Bayesian equilibria in a game where the type of each party is private information.
3Nash equilibria (msne). It has the disadvantage, however, that the probability of winning function
is exogenously given. That is, it is taken as a primitive, instead of being derived endogenously
from parties’ uncertainty about the median ideal point. Furthermore, the paper is also silent about
when a psne may exist, and how equilibria (either in pure or mixed strategies) may look like. It
doesn’t analyze uniqueness either.
In this paper, we reconsider the problem of existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in
the hybrid election game with stochastic preferences. First, we show that, under the mma, parties’
payoﬀs are neither continuous nor semi-continuous. This implies that, unless both have homogenous
interests in power, the less ideological party may have incentives to undercut the other party’s
position, moving its own position to an alternative arbitrarily close to the platform of the other.
In cases like that, best reply correspondences are empty and, therefore, a psne does not exist. In
particular, this happens if one party is oﬃce motivated and the other entirely ideological.
Second, we prove that, in spite of having discontinuous payoﬀs, the hybrid game is payoﬀ secure
and reciprocally upper semi-continuous. So, following Reny [24], we conclude that the blame for
the nonexistence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for all parametric conditions can be
fully assigned to the violation of quasi-concavity. Moreover, we show that non-convexities matter
only if the relative interest in holding oﬃce is heterogeneous across parties.7 By contrast, in the
homogeneous case, regardless of whether the motivations are mixed or not, we prove that a unique
pure strategy Nash equilibrium always exists, obtaining as a particular case of that result the well
known Downsian and Wittman electoral equilibria.
Finally, in the case in which parties are distinctly concerned about winning the election, we
argue that the relatively more ideological party must take into account that the rival may be willing
to “copy” its platform. To avoid this, it must draw its proposal from a probability distribution.
This induces a similar behavior in the opposition. The paper proves that a pair of probability
measures that are best responses to each other always exists.8 Speciﬁcally, it shows that the mixed
extension of the hybrid election game is better reply secure. Therefore, invoking Reny [24], we
conclude that a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium do indeed exist.9 This extends Ball [4] to the case
where the function mapping candidates’ platforms to their probabilities of winning the election is
derived from primitives about electoral uncertainty, and it generalizes previous existence results in
unidimensional electoral competition.
2 The model
Consider a society with two political parties (candidates), noted 1 and 2, and a continuum of voters,
indexed by a type θ ∈ [0,1]. Assume θ is distributed according with a continuous distribution
function F, with density f, and F(θm) = 1/2 for some θm ∈ (0,1). Let [0,1] denote the policy
space. Following Duggan and Fey [12], Bernhardt et al. [5] and many others in the literature,
suppose individual preferences are continuous, single-peaked and symmetric on [0,1], and adopt
the usual utility representation given in A1:
Assumption (A1) u(x; θ) = −|x − θ|, where |   | is the absolute value on R.
7The necessity of this feature for nonexistence of psne was not addressed before, and it considerably sharpens
Ball’s [4] results. I thank the referee for this remark.
8Saporiti [28] oﬀers more details about how equilibria may look like in a tractable version of the model.
9For other applications of mixed strategies in electoral competition, see Kramer [18], Laslier [20], Aragones and
Palfrey [2], Duggan and Jackson [11] and Bernhardt et al. [5].
4Let Ai = [0,1] denote party i’s strategy set, with generic action (platform) xi, and A = A1×A2
the set of all strategy proﬁles. We refer to D(A) = {(x1,x2) ∈ A : x1 = x2} as the diagonal of
the product of the strategy sets; or, for conciseness, just as “the diagonal”. Like in the ordinary
electoral competition game, assume each party simultaneously announces a platform xi in [0,1].
Then, given a proposal (x1,x2) ∈ A, each voter votes for the policy he likes the most, where
S(x1,x2) = {θ ∈ [0,1] : u(x1;θ) > u(x2;θ)} denotes the set of types that support x1. The party
whose platform obtains more than half of the votes wins the election, and its policy is implemented.
Ties are broken by a random draw, so that each party wins with probability one half if all voters
are indiﬀerent between the two platforms.
In addition to the uncertainty due to the possibility of a tie, parties are also uncertain about
voters’ preferences. Following Roemer [27], we assume parties perceive the fraction of types that
supports their platform with a certain noise. Formally, let ξ be an error term, distributed according
with a continuous distribution function H on [−β, β], β > 0, with density h, and H(0) = 1/2.
Assumption (A2) For each pair (x1,x2)  ∈ D(A), parties believe that the fraction of types sup-
porting x1 is F(S(x1,x2)) + ξ, and 1/2 if the strategy proﬁle (x1,x2) ∈ D(A).10







if (x1,x2)  ∈ D(A)
1/2 if (x1,x2) ∈ D(A),
(1)
where it is understood that H(y) = 0 if y ≤ −β and H(y) = 1 if y ≥ β. The probability that party
2 attaches to winning the contest takes an analogous form, and is given by 1 − p(x1,x2).
It is immediate from (1) that p(x1,x2) is discontinuous at every point on D(A), except at
(θm,θm), where θm is the median ideal point. As it happens in other applications, notably in price
competition, these discontinuities are created by the tie-breaking rule implicit in (1), according to
which, if parties coincide in their platforms at a certain point on the diagonal, indiﬀerent voters
split equally among them, regardless of their distribution in a neighboring point arbitrarily close
to that location.
This “equally sharing” rule is the standard tie-breaking rule used in the literature on electoral
competition under uncertainty. And, except for a very recent article by Duggan and Jackson
[11] on multidimensional electoral competition, which assumes indiﬀerent voters play symmetric
voting strategies, I am aware of no systematic analysis of political competition with endogenous
sharing rules or other tie-breaking rules.11 This is particularly true in the unidimensional two-
party election game since, with the exception of the hybrid game analyzed here, and Bernhardt et
al.’s [5] probabilistic Downsian game with private pooling, the rest always admit under reasonable
conditions the existence of a psne.
Let χi ≥ 0 be the intrinsic value that party i places on being in oﬃce, and θi the preferences
on [0,1] that it represents. Deﬁne the function ψ(x,y;θ) = u(x;θ) − u(y;θ). Parties’ objective
functions are deﬁned as follows:
Assumption (A3) For each strategy proﬁle (x1,x2) ∈ A, party 1’s payoﬀ function is given










10Recall that, by A1, for each (x1,x2)  ∈ D(A), F(I(x1,x2)) = 0, where I(x1,x2) = {θ : u(x1;θ) = u(x2;θ)}.
11In price competition, this issue has been recently addressed by Hoernig [16].
5In words, A3 says that in our model political parties have preferences over the implemented
policy, but also on the oﬃce itself. Moreover, the payoﬀs are separable in these arguments. Of
course, this need not be the case, and one can imagine situations where parties care more about
policy if they win the election than if they lose. In addition, there might be other motivations to
consider. For example, a party may have preferences over its margin of victory (vote share), apart
from policies and winning the election. However, A3 seems the simplest case to begin with.
It is easy to see that the payoﬀ functions of the traditional models of electoral competition are
particular instances of A3. In eﬀect, if χi = 0, then πi(x) represents the objective function of the
Wittman game, where parties seek the best policy outcome from the election. On the other hand,
if χi → +∞, then each party maximizes the probability of winning the contest, without caring
at all about policies, which is the classical assumption of the Downsian game.12 The hybrid case,
where ∀i, χi > 0, and χ1 is not necessarily equal to χ2, is somewhere between these two extreme
and symmetric cases.
Regarding the speciﬁcation of the mma adopted in A3, note that we follow Wittman [30], Ball
[4], Duggan [9] and Austen-Smith and Banks [3]; and, more generally, Ferejohn’s [13] idea that
policymakers enjoy some rents from being in power. But there is an alternative way to express
the mixed motivations. Following Calvert [6], Aragones and Palfrey [1] and Groseclose [14] assume
that the objective function of each party is a linear combination of the probability of winning the
election and a second component corresponding to its policy preferences. Speciﬁcally, using ˆ πj to
denote this alternative formulation of parties’ payoﬀs, we have that
ˆ π1(x1,x2) = λ1p(x1,x2) + (1 − λ1)p(x1,x2)ψ(x1,x2;θ1),
ˆ π2(x1,x2) = λ2(1 − p(x1,x2)) + (1 − λ2)(1 − p(x1,x2))ψ(x2,x1;θ2),
where λj is the weight that party j assigns on holding oﬃce. Simple algebraic manipulation shows
that, for the main purpose of our analysis, these two formulations are equivalent. In eﬀect, denoting
χj =
λj
1−λj, it follows that





= (1 − λ1)π1(x1,x2),





= (1 − λ2)π2(x1,x2).
Thus, since λj ∈ (0,1), the equations above show that, for all j = 1,2, ˆ πj is a strictly increasing
linear transformation of πj. Hence, the results about equilibrium existence and uniqueness derived
in Sections 3 and 4, for pure and mixed strategies, respectively, extend directly to this alternative
way to express the mma.
Finally, with respect to the technical consequences of A3, note that together with (1) it implies
that parties’ payoﬀs are discontinuous on D(A), except at (θm,θm). Furthermore, as Example 1
and Lemma 1 below show, πi is neither upper semi-continuous nor lower semi-continuous on A,13
12Notice that ˜ πi(x) = 1/χi πi(x) represents the same preferences than πi(x), and that limχ1→∞ ˜ π1(x) = p(x) and
limχ2→∞ ˜ π2(x) = 1 − p(x).
13A function f : Y → R on a nonempty and compact subset Y ⊂ R
k is upper semi-continuous (u.s.c.) at y if for
any sequence {y
n} ⊆ Y such that y
n → y, limsupn→∞ f(y
n) ≤ f(y). On the other hand, f is lower semi-continuous
(l.s.c) at y if −f is u.s.c. at y.
6and except for the case where χ1 = χ2, the sum of the payoﬀs Π = π1 + π2 is also discontinuous
on D(A). The reason for this is the discontinuities in the probability of winning function entail
discontinuous shifts of the electorate from one party’s platform to the other. Therefore, if platforms
are not equally proﬁtable for parties, total payoﬀ also changes discontinuously.
Example 1 Suppose ξ and θ are uniformly distributed, and assume that θ1 < θm < θ2. Take
a point xδ = (θm + δ,θm + δ) ∈ D(A), δ > 0, and a sequence (xn
1,xn
2) = (θm + δ − 1
n,θm + δ),





















2 = π1(xδ). Similarly, consider now a sequence
(ˆ xn
1, ˆ xn
2) = (θm + δ + 1
n,θm + δ) that converges to xδ from the right. Since ˆ xn
1 > ˆ xn
2, π1(ˆ xn
1, ˆ xn















2 = π1(xδ). Hence, π1 is neither
l.s.c. nor u.s.c. at xδ. ￿
Lemma 1 Π = π1 + π2 is continuous on A if only if χ1 = χ2.
Proof. By A3, Π(x1,x2) = φ(x1,x2;θ1,θ2) + ψ(x2,x1;θ2) + χ2, where φ(x1,x2;θ1,θ2) =
p(x1,x2)[ψ(x1,x2;θ1) − ψ(x2,x1;θ2) + (χ1 − χ2)]. Since u( ;θ2) is continuous in x and χ2 is a
constant, ψ( , ;θ2)+χ2 is continuous on A. On the other hand, for any ¯ x1  = ¯ x2, p( ) is continuous
at ¯ x = (¯ x1, ¯ x2), because H and F are continuous functions. Hence, by A1, φ( , ;θ1,θ2) is also con-





2) → (¯ x1, ¯ x2). Note that φ(¯ x1, ¯ x2;θ1,θ2) = (χ1 − χ2)/2. Thus, if χ1 = χ2,




2) → (¯ x1, ¯ x2), we have that
limxn→¯ x φ(xn
1,xn













1;θ2) converges to zero as xn → ¯ x. Therefore, Π is continuous
on A.
Instead, if χ1  = χ2, then the term p(xn
1,xn
2)(χ1 − χ2) does not converge to (χ1 − χ2)/2 as
xn → ¯ x, except at (¯ x1, ¯ x2) = (θm,θm). Hence, the discontinuities of the probability of winning the
election create discontinuities not only in each payoﬀ, but also in the sum. ￿
Note that Example 1 and Lemma 1 stand in sharp contrast with Roemer [26], where it is shown
that, in spite of the discontinuities of the probability of winning function, purely ideological parties
have continuous payoﬀs. More importantly, it suggests that even if only one party assigns an
arbitrarily small weight on winning the election, this completely invalidates Roemer’s [26] and [27]
equilibrium analysis, leaving the question of existence without answer. This disturbing observation
constitutes one of the main motivations of the current research.
Let G = [(Ai, πi);i = 1,2] be the two-party hybrid electoral competition game under uncertainty,
where each party payoﬀ function πi satisﬁes A1-A3.
Deﬁnition 1 A pure strategy Nash equilibrium of G is a strategy proﬁle (x∗
1,x∗
2) ∈ A such that,







We denote NE(G) the set of all psne of G. For the particular case where χ1 = χ2 = ∞, that
is, for the Downsian game, and for χ1 = χ2 = 0, which represents the Wittman game, it is well
known that this set is nonempty. We will not go further into the details of these results, except to
mention that the interested reader can ﬁnd a comprehensive analysis in Roemer [27].
7On the other hand, in the hybrid case, where ∀i = 1,2, χi > 0, the discontinuities of the
payoﬀ functions do not allow to apply the traditional analysis of equilibrium existence, based
on the direct application of a ﬁxed point theorem. However, it is possible to circumvent this
diﬃculty by invoking recent suﬃcient conditions given by Reny [24]. To do that, we introduce the
following notation and deﬁnitions. Let d : Rk → R+ be the usual distance function on Rk, and
Bδ(y) = {x ∈ Rk : d(x,y) < δ} the open ball about y with radius δ > 0.
Deﬁnition 2 Party 1 can secure a payoﬀ α ∈ R at (x1,x2) ∈ A if there exists ˜ x1 ∈ A1 and δ > 0
such that, ∀x′
2 ∈ Bδ(x2), π1(˜ x1,x′
2) ≥ α.
This deﬁnition can be extended in the obvious way to party 2. In words, party i can secure
a payoﬀ α at x if it has a strategy that guarantees at least that payoﬀ even if the other slightly
deviates from x.
Deﬁnition 3 G is payoﬀ secure if ∀x ∈ A and ∀ǫ > 0, each party i can secure a payoﬀ of πi(x)−ǫ
at x.
Payoﬀ security requires that for every proﬁle x ∈ A, each party has a strategy that virtually
guarantees the payoﬀ he receives at x even if the other slightly deviates from x.
Let π : A → R2 be the vector payoﬀ function of G, deﬁned as, ∀x ∈ A, π(x) = (π1(x),π2(x)).
The graph of π is a subset of A × R2. That is, gr(π) = {(x,π) ∈ A × R2 : ∀i, πi(x) = πi}. Let
cl(gr(π)) be the closure of the graph of the vector payoﬀ function.14
Deﬁnition 4 G is reciprocally upper semi-continuous if ∀(ˆ x, ˆ π) ∈ cl(gr(π)) such that ∀i, πi(ˆ x) ≤
ˆ πi, it follows that ∀i,πi(ˆ x) = ˆ πi.
Reciprocally upper semi-continuity (r.u.s.c.) generalizes the condition introduced by Dasgupta
and Maskin [7] that the sum of the players’ payoﬀs be upper semi-continuous. In eﬀect, suppose Π is
u.s.c. on A, and assume, by contradiction, there exists (¯ x, ¯ π) ∈ cl(gr(π)) such that ∀i, πi(¯ x) ≤ ¯ πi,
and π(¯ x)  = ¯ π. Then, π1(¯ x) + π2(¯ x) < ¯ π1 + ¯ π2. Consider a sequence (xn
1,xn
2) ⊆ A such that
(xn
1,xn
2) → (¯ x1, ¯ x2) and ∀i, limsupxn→¯ x πi(xn
1,xn
2) = ¯ πi. Since (¯ x, ¯ π) ∈ cl(gr(π)), this sequence
always exists. Then, limsupxn→¯ x Π(xn) = ¯ π1 + ¯ π2. On the other hand, limsupxn→¯ x Π(xn) ≤
π1(¯ x) + π2(¯ x), because Π is u.s.c. on A. Hence, ¯ π1 + ¯ π2 ≤ π1(¯ x) + π2(¯ x), a contradiction. Thus, if
Π is u.s.c., the game must be r.u.s.c. Now, we turn to the equilibrium analysis.
3 Pure strategy analysis
This section contains three main results. First of all, we prove in Section 3.1 that the hybrid election
game is payoﬀ secure and reciprocally upper semi-continuous. Then, in Section 3.2, we present an
example which illustrates the fact that, with mixed motives, the unidimensional two-party electoral
competition game does not always possess a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. As we said in the
Introduction, this problem has been already pointed out in Ball [4]. However, here we argue that,
because Reny’s conditions are satisﬁed, the nonexistence of a psne for all parametric conditions
is a direct consequence of the violation of quasi-concavity. Finally, in Section 3.3 we show that
non-convexities matter only if the relative interest in holding oﬃce is heterogeneous across parties




∗) ∈ cl(gr(π)) if and only if ∀ǫ > 0, Bǫ(x
∗,π
∗) ∩ gr(π)  = ∅.
83.1 Reny’s conditions
Let’s start showing that G satisﬁes payoﬀ security and r.u.s.c. These properties will be useful not
only to understand why a psne does not always exist, but also to show in Section 4 that the mixed
extension is better reply secure (yet to be deﬁned).
Lemma 2 G is payoﬀ secure.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, ∃ ¯ x = (¯ x1, ¯ x2) ∈ A and ¯ ǫ > 0 such that for some i the payoﬀ
πi(¯ x) − ¯ ǫ cannot be secured at ¯ x. Without loss of generality, assume i = 1. The fact that party
1 cannot secure π1(¯ x) − ¯ ǫ at ¯ x implies that ∀˜ x1 ∈ A1, and ∀δ > 0, ∃ x′
2 ∈ Bδ(¯ x2) such that
π1(˜ x1,x′
2) < π1(¯ x1, ¯ x2) − ¯ ǫ. If (¯ x1, ¯ x2)  ∈ D(A), then π1 is continuous at ¯ x. Therefore, ∃¯ δ > 0 such
that ∀x′
2 ∈ B¯ δ(¯ x2), π1(¯ x1,x′
2) > π1(¯ x1, ¯ x2) − ¯ ǫ. That is, if ¯ x1  = ¯ x2, we have a strategy for party
1, ¯ x1, and an interval for x2, determined by ¯ δ > 0, which contradict our initial hypothesis. Hence,
(¯ x1, ¯ x2) ∈ D(A), and π1(¯ x) = χ1/2. If χ1 = 0, then π1 is continuous on A, (see Roemer [26],
Lemma 1), so that the previous argument goes through as before. Instead, if χ1 > 0, three cases
are possible, depending on the position of ¯ x1 and θ1 over [0,1].15
Case 1: θ1 < ¯ x1 < θm. Consider an alternative ˜ x1 ∈ A1, ˜ x1 > ¯ x1, close enough to ¯ x1. Deﬁne
¯ δ = d(˜ x1, ¯ x1) and B¯ δ(¯ x2). We choose ˜ x1 so that θ1 < ¯ x1 − ¯ δ and ¯ x1 + ¯ δ < θm. Since θ1 < ¯ x1 < θm,
this number always exists. By A1, ∀x′
2 ∈ B¯ δ(¯ x2), π1(˜ x1,x′
2) = p(˜ x1,x′
2)
 
χ1 − (1 − α)¯ δ
 
, where
α ∈ (−1,1). Notice that p is discontinuous at ¯ x, so p(˜ x1,x′
2) is well above 1/2. On the other
hand, p is bounded. Therefore, ∃ ¯ δ > 0 small enough such that ∀x′
2 ∈ B¯ δ(¯ x2) and ∀ǫ > 0,
π(˜ x1,x′

















Case 1 Case 2
Figure 2: Payoﬀ security
Case 2: ¯ x1 < θ1 < θm. Like in the previous case, consider ˜ x1 > ¯ x1 and ¯ δ = d(˜ x1, ¯ x1), such that
¯ x1+¯ δ < θ1. By A1, for all x′
2 ∈ B¯ δ(¯ x2), π1(˜ x1,x′
2) = p(˜ x1,x′
2)
 
(1 − α)¯ δ + χ1
 
, α ∈ (−1,1). Again,
p(˜ x1,x′
2) > 1/2. Moreover, (1 − α)¯ δ > 0. Hence, ∀x′
2 ∈ B¯ δ(¯ x2) and ∀ǫ > 0, π(˜ x1,x′
2) > χ1/2 − ǫ:
contradiction.
Case 3: θ1 < ¯ x1 = θm. Since the probability of winning p(x1,x2) is continuous at (θm,θm),
π1(θm, ) is continuous in x2. Therefore, applying the argument based on continuity, we get the
desired result. ￿
15It is easy to check that the remaining situations are variations of these three cases.




9Lemma 3 For all χ1, χ2 ∈ R++, G is reciprocally upper semi-continuous.
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, there exists (¯ x, ¯ π) ∈ cl(gr(π)) such that ∀i, ¯ πi ≥ πi(¯ x), and
(π1(¯ x),π2(¯ x))  = (¯ π1, ¯ π2). Then, (¯ x1, ¯ x2) ∈ D(A). By hypothesis, there exists i such that ¯ πi >
πi(¯ x). Without loss of generality, suppose i = 1. Consider a sequence (xn
1,xn
2) ⊆ A such that
(xn
1,xn
2) → (¯ x1, ¯ x2) and ∀i, limsupxn→¯ x πi(xn
1,xn
2) = ¯ πi. Since (¯ x, ¯ π) ∈ cl(gr(π)), this sequence
always exists. Notice that ¯ π1 = p(xn
1,xn
2)χ1. On the other hand, π1(¯ x1, ¯ x2) = 1/2χ1. Therefore,
[1 − p(xn
1,xn
2)]χ2 < 1/2χ2. But this implies that ¯ π2 < π2(¯ x): contradiction. Hence, G is r.u.s.c. ￿
By Lemma 1, G is also reciprocally upper semi-continuous if either χ1 = χ2 = 0, or χ1 = χ2 = ∞,
because Π is continuous on A. On the contrary, it violates r.u.s.c. if, for example, one party is
oﬃce motivated, and the other entirely ideological; i.e., if for some i  = j, χi = 0 and χj = +∞.
Intuitively, this happens because when a point on the diagonal is reached, parties’ payoﬀs all jump
in the same direction, except of course at the median ideal policy.17 Interestingly enough, our next
proposition also indicates that, under the previous assumption, that is, if parties’ relative interest
in power is completely opposite, the hybrid election game not only violates r.u.s.c, but also a psne
does not exist.
Assumption (A4) Party 1 is policy motivated (i.e., χ1 = 0), and represents a type θ1  = θm.
Party 2 is oﬃce motivated (i.e., χ2 → +∞).
Proposition 1 If G satisﬁes A1-A4, then NE(G) = ∅.
Proof. Fix the strategy proﬁle (θm,θm) ∈ A, and consider party 1’s deviation x1  = θm. By A1,
F(S(x1,θm)) < 1/2. Then, p(x1,θm) = 1−H[1/2−F(S(x1,θm))] < 1/2 = p(θm,θm). By continuity
of F and H, ∃ δ > 0 such that ∀x1 ∈ Bδ(θm), p(x1,θm) > 0. And again, by A1, for ǫ = d(θm,θ1)
and ∀x1 ∈ Bǫ(θ1), ψ(x1,θm;θ1) > 0. Hence, ∀x1 ∈ Bǫ(θ1) ∩ Bδ(θm), π1(x1,θm) > 0 = π1(θm,θm),
implying that (θm,θm)  ∈ NE(G).
Next, consider any (x,x) ∈ D(A), x  = θm. Let δ = d(x,θm). By A1, ∀˜ x ∈ Bδ(θm), F(S(x, ˜ x)) <
1/2 and, therefore, π2(x, ˜ x) = 1−p(x, ˜ x) > 1/2 = π2(x,x). Thus, (x,x)  ∈ NE(G). Finally, suppose
there exists (x1,x2) ∈ A − D(A) such that (x1,x2) ∈ NE(G). Without loss of generality, let
θ1 > θm. Then, x1 ≥ θm. Suppose not. If x2 > x1, party 1 can deviate to ˜ x1 = θm, and increase
both ψ( ,x2,θ1) and p( ,x2). On the other hand, if x2 < x1, the deviation x′
2 = x1 increases party
2’s payoﬀ. Therefore, x1 ≥ θm. Moreover, if x1 = θm, then (θm,x2)  ∈ NE(G), since 2 can deviate
to θm and increase its probability of being in power. Thus, x1 > θm. But then, for any x2 ∈ [0,1],
x2  = x1, there exists δ > 0 such that ∀˜ x2 ∈ (x1 − δ,x1), p(x1, ˜ x2) < p(x1,x2), contradicting that
(x1,x2) ∈ NE(G).18 ￿
Proposition 1 reveals a displeasing feature of unidimensional electoral competition. However,
since the result is obtained under A4, which is an extreme hypothesis about parties’ motives,
one could initially think that the problem is created by that assumption. Unfortunately, this is
not the case. To see this in more detail, in the next section we discuss the uniform distribution





2) = (¯ x, ¯ x −
1
n) ⊆ A, where n > 0 and
θm < ¯ x < θ









1), is positive and converges to 0 as n → ∞, while party




2), increases ﬁrst above 1/2, and then it drops down to 1/2 when (¯ x, ¯ x) is reached.
18That is, if x1 > θm, party 2 would like to choose the largest platform that is just below x1. However, since the
policy space is a continuum, this value is not well deﬁned.
10version of the hybrid election game. The example conﬁrms that the message coming out from
Proposition 1 is not an artifact of A4, but a more general feature of electoral competition. In
particular, it points out that, if parties have heterogeneous interests in power, (i.e., if χ1  = χ2),
though not necessarily opposite, then the existence of a psne depends upon the relationship between
the electoral uncertainty, the aggregate level of opportunism and its distribution among political
parties.
3.2 Uniform distribution
Suppose ξ is uniformly distributed on [−β,β]. Let θ1 < θm < θ2 and χi > 0 for all i. Consider
an equilibrium candidate (x∗
1,x∗
2) for this version of the hybrid game, with the property that
θ1 < x∗
1 < x∗
2 < θ2. Near the equilibrium, parties’ payoﬀs can be rewritten as
π1(x1,x2) = p(x1,x2) (x2 − x1 + χ1),
π2(x1,x2) = (1 − p(x1,x2))(x2 − x1 + χ2),
where p(x1,x2) = 1
2β[F(S(x1,x2)) − 1
2 + β] if x1  = x2, and p(x1,x2) = 1/2 otherwise. Taking the
ﬁrst order conditions, we have












Assuming that θ is also uniformly distributed on [0,1] and solving (2), it follows that x∗
1 =
1/2 − β + χ1/2 and x∗


















constitutes indeed a Nash equilibrium of the game. The ﬁrst condition, 2β − 1 < χi, ensures that
x∗
1 > 0 and x∗
2 < 1. On the other hand, in order to guarantee that x∗
1 < x∗
2, we need
χ1 + χ2 < 4β, (3)
which is fulﬁlled if χi < 2β for all i. In fact, this implies that x∗
1 < θm < x∗
2.19
Contrary, if (3) is not satisﬁed, that is, if the aggregate level of opportunism, measured by
χ1 + χ2, is relatively high compared with the electoral uncertainty, represented by β, then (x∗
1,x∗
2)
is not an equilibrium. Is there any other candidate? Since θ1 < θm < θ2, it is clear that x1 > x2
cannot be a Nash equilibrium either. Hence, the only remaining possibility is x1 = x2.
Assume that χ1 + χ2 ≥ 4β. Consider ﬁrst the case where parties have homogeneous motiva-
tions, i.e. χ1 = χ2 = χ. Take the pair (x1,x2) = (θm,θm) as the equilibrium candidate. Then
∀i, πi(θm,θm) = χ/2. Consider party 1’s deviation to x′
1 = θm − δ, δ > 0. (Recall that deviations

















19Second order conditions also hold, because ∀i, ∂
2πi/∂x
2
i = −2 < 0.
11This deviation is proﬁtable, that is, π1(x′
1,θm) > π1(θm,θm), if and only if δ < 2β − χ. But, since
χ ≥ 2β, this requires δ < 0, a contradiction.
In the same way, consider party 2’s deviation to x′
2 = θm + δ, δ > 0. Following the same
reasoning, π2(θm,x′
2) > π2(θm,θm) if and only if δ < 2β − χ, which contradicts again the initial
hypothesis. Therefore, since 2 cannot improve its payoﬀ by deviating to the left of θm or above θ2,
it follows that (θm,θm) is indeed a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of G.20
What about the other case in which χ1  = χ2? Is (θm,θm) a psne? As before, a deviation
is proﬁtable for party i only if δ < 2β − χi. Suppose χ1 = 3β/2 and χ2 = 5β/2. Note that we
still have χ1 + χ2 ≥ 4β. Therefore, there is no psne with x1 < x2. Moreover, for β > 1/2 and
δ < 1/4, any deviation x′
1 = θm − δ is such that π1(x′
1,θm) > π1(θm,θm). So, (θm,θm) is not a
Nash equilibrium either. Finally, since x1 > x2 and x1 = x2  = θm cannot be equilibrium strategies,
it follows that, for these values of χ1, χ2 and β, the hybrid election game does not possess a psne.
3.3 Equilibrium existence
The previous section oﬀers interesting insights about electoral competition. First, it shows that,
although χi > 0 creates discontinuities in parties’ payoﬀs, this does not necessarily preclude the
existence of a psne. At least in the uniform distribution case, no matter how diﬀerent are χ1 and
χ2, if the aggregate level of opportunism is low relative to the electoral uncertainty, then a psne
always exists. In the example, suﬃcient conditions are 2β −1 < χi < 2β for all i = 1,2. Moreover,
in that case the equilibrium is such that x∗
1 < x∗
2. That is, equilibrium platforms do not converge,
though x∗
i → θm as χi → 2β.
On the other hand, when the aggregate level of opportunism is high, (that is, when (3) does
not hold), and it is relatively more concentrated in one party, then a psne may not exist. In the
example, this occurs if (i) χ1 + χ2 ≥ 4β, and (ii) χ1 < 2β. This result is driven by two forces. On
one hand, the relatively more opportunistic party precludes equilibria with policy diﬀerentiation.
On the other, the relatively more ideological party blocks, due to its excessive policy orientation, a
Nash equilibrium at the median position.
Remarkably, in our model the nonexistence of a psne is not related with the dimensionality of
the policy space, nor the heterogeneity of interests in the electorate, which are usually viewed in
the literature as the main causes behind existence problems.21 In this regard, notice that the model
satisﬁes two extremely nice properties, frequently invoked to guarantee equilibria: (i) the policy
space is unidimensional; and (ii) voters’ preferences are single-peaked and symmetric, so that they
admit the existence of a unique Condorcet winner.
Moreover, contrary to Ball [4], we argue that it is not directly related with neither, the discon-
tinuities of the probability of winning function, nor the mixed motivations. As Lemmas 2 and 3
already showed, G is payoﬀ secure and r.u.s.c. for all χ1,χ2 ∈ R++. Thus, following Reny’s [24]
Corollary 3.3, our game should always possess a psne, provided that each party’s payoﬀ function
is quasi-concave in its own strategy. This shows that the real blame for the failure of the hy-
brid electoral competition game to possess a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for all parametric
20That is, provided that parties’ beneﬁts of holding oﬃce are suﬃciently high relative to the uncertainty, the
convergence to the median ideal policy still holds under mixed motivations. This is consistent with Calvert [6], who
showed that “small departures” from the classic assumptions (i.e., oﬃce motivation and certainty) lead to only “small
departures” from convergence.
21As we immediately show, it is due to the heterogeneity of interests among parties!
12conditions can be fully assigned to the violation of quasi-concavity.22 Example 2 below further
illustrates this point.
Example 2 Consider the uniform case studied before. Fix β = 1/2 and x2 = 49
100. Assume χ1 = 3
4
and θ1 = 1
4. Under these conditions, party 1’s conditional payoﬀ can be written as
π1(x1,x2) =

     





















4 ≤ x1 < 49
100,
3










100 < x1 ≤ 1.
Notice that π1(3/8,49/100) = 0.3741125, limx1→−49/100 π1(x1,x2) = 0.3675 and
limx1→+49/100 π1(x1,x2) = 0.3825. Therefore, π1( ,x2) is not quasi-concave in x1, since we can
take for instance the convex combination xλ
1 = (1 − λ)3
8 + λ 491
1000 and get π1(xλ
1,49/100) <
min{π1(3/8,49/100),π1(491/1000,49/100)} for all λ ∈ (0,1). ￿
Regarding equilibrium existence, however, note that the non-convexities of the conditional pay-
oﬀs are important only if the relative interest in power is heterogeneous across parties. In eﬀect,
if parties have heterogeneous motivations, then there is no reason to believe they will locate at the
median, or on their own ideological side. Contrary, in order to undercut the rival’s proposal, they
may ﬁnd proﬁtable to move their platforms to the other party’s ideological arena. So, in principle,
the game could reach a point on the diagonal where the discontinuities and non-convexities play
an active role against existence. In fact, this is not just a possibility. As we saw, it happens indeed
under certain parameters’ values.
By contrast, if motivations are homogeneous, (i.e., if χ1 = χ2), parties never ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to behave in the way depicted above. Therefore, under the conditions speciﬁed below, the uni-
dimensional, two-party electoral competition game always possesses a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies. For the uniform distribution, this was already illustrated in Section 3.2, since χ1 = χ2
led to an equilibrium where both parties converge to the median ideal policy, or to an equilibrium
where each candidate plays a pure strategy in its own ideological side. Now, we generalize the
result for any probability distribution.
To do that, we introduce the following two additional assumptions.
Assumption (A5) θ1 < θm < θ2.
In words, A5 simply says that party 1 is left-oriented and party 2 right-oriented. As Calvert [6]
reckoned, this case where parties’ policy goals are opposed to one another relative to the electorate
seems the important case to focus on.
Assumption (A6) log(p(x1,x2)) and log(1 − p(x1,x2)) are concave in x1 and x2, respectively.
The last assumption is certainly not nice. However, it is standard in the literature on electoral
competition with ideological parties. The point is that, as it happens in the probabilistic version
of the Wittman game, no simple conditions are known to ensure the concavity of the probability
of winning function. For more on this, see the discussion in Roemer [27].
Now we state and prove our ﬁrst theorem.
22Wittman [30] showed that conditional payoﬀs are concave. However, the argument rested on the assumption that
the probability of winning the election is continuous, which is obviously not true.
13Theorem 1 If G veriﬁes A1-A3, A5 and A6 and χ1 = χ2, then NE(G)  = ∅.
Proof. Consider the following restricted game ˆ G = [( ˆ Ai,log(πi| ˆ A)); i = 1,2], where ˆ A1 = [0,θm],
ˆ A2 = [θm,1], and πi| ˆ A represents the restriction of πi over ˆ A = ˆ A1× ˆ A2. Note that, ˆ Ai is nonempty,
compact and convex, and log(πi| ˆ A) is continuous, because p(x1,x2) is continuous on ˆ A. Moreover,
log(π1| ˆ A(x1,x2)) = log(p(x1,x2)) + log(ψ(x1,x2;θ1) + χ1),
log(π2| ˆ A(x1,x2)) = log(1 − p(x1,x2)) + log(ψ(x2,x1;θ2) + χ2).
Hence, for each ﬁxed value of xj, log(πi| ˆ A), i  = j, is concave on xi. And using Kakutani’s ﬁxed
point theorem, it follows that there exists a strategy proﬁle (x∗
1,x∗
2) ∈ ˆ A such that ∀(x1,x2) ∈ ˆ A,
π1| ˆ A(x∗
1,x∗
2) ≥ π1| ˆ A(x1,x∗
2) and π2| ˆ A(x∗
1,x∗
2) ≥ π2| ˆ A(x∗
1,x2). Thus, (x∗
1,x∗
2) is a psne of ˆ G.
Next, we show that (x∗
1,x∗
2) is also a psne of the original game G = [(Ai,πi); i = 1,2]. To do
that, we expand the set of strategies of both parties, and we study the incentives for unilateral
deviations from the equilibrium candidate. For brevity, with carry out the analysis for party 1, but
a similar argument also applies to the other party. There are two cases to consider, depending on
the features of the equilibrium in ˆ G.
Case 1. If x∗
1 = x∗
2 = θm, then it is immediate to see that there is no deviation ˜ x1 > θm such that
π1(˜ x1,θm) > π1(θm,θm) = χ1/2. In eﬀect, this would require (p(˜ x1,θm)−1/2)χ1 +p(˜ x1,θm)(θm −
˜ x1) > 0. However, p(˜ x1,θm) < 1/2, θm < ˜ x1, and χ1 ≥ 0. Therefore, such alternative ˜ x1 does not
exist, and (θm,θm) ∈ NE(G).
Case 2. If x∗
1 < x∗
2, then three cases are possible. Suppose ﬁrst x∗
1 < θm = x∗
2. Then, party 1’s






That is, party 1’s best response to θm does not change in going from ˆ A1 = [0,θm] to A1 = [0,1].
Similarly, if x∗
1 < θm < x∗
2, then (∗) holds, because log(π1(x1,x∗
2)) is continuous everywhere except
at x∗
2, and it drops down to the right of x∗
2. Party 1’s conditional payoﬀ is not longer concave, but
it is strictly quasi-concave, so that its unique maximum on A1 coincides again with its restricted
maximum on ˆ A1.
Finally, assume x∗
1 = θm < x∗
2. In this case, we cannot conclude that (∗) holds, because x∗
1
is a corner solution in the restricted game. Therefore, π1(x1,x∗
2) could increase to the right of
θm. However, we claim that such a pair of strategies cannot be a psne of ˆ G. Instead, suppose
(x∗
1,x∗
2) ∈ NE(ˆ G), where NE(ˆ G) is the set of psne of ˆ G. Diﬀerentiating πi with respect to xi and
evaluating it at (x∗
1,x∗






















































2) > 1/2. Hence, these conditions cannot be simultaneously satisﬁed. This complete
the proof. ￿
14The result above generalizes the well known existence results corresponding to the Downsian
and the Wittman electoral game. It clearly shows that the failure of the hybrid election game
to always possess a psne does not lie behind the discontinuities of the payoﬀ functions nor the
mixed motivation assumption, but on parties’ heterogeneous interests in power. Instead, in the
homogeneous case, if parties locate on the diagonal, it must be at the median ideal policy. Hence,
the discontinuities and non-convexities of the payoﬀs do not play a major role. This explain why
“positive results” predominate all around Figure 1, where parties’ (homogeneous) motivations are
represented in the width of the rectangle.
As Section 3.2 suggests, however, things become much more complicated when we add a third
dimension into the analysis, diﬀerentiating party 1’s motivation from those of party 2. To deal
with these cases, in Section 4 we analyze whether the mixed extension of the hybrid election game
possesses a Nash equilibrium. Before that, however, we close this section examining the number of
psne in the homogeneous case.
3.4 Uniqueness
Having shown that the homogeneous version of the hybrid electoral competition game always has
a psne, we can now ask about the cardinality of NE(G). To do that, we assume until the end of
this section that the hypotheses of Theorem 1 hold.
Proposition 2 Suppose the hybrid election game G satisﬁes A1-A3, A5 and A6, and let χ1 = χ2 =
χ. Then, NE(G) is a singleton.
The proof of Proposition 2 rests on three results. The ﬁrst one says that, if the hybrid game
has a psne on the diagonal, it must be at the median ideal policy, so that parties’ payoﬀs around
the equilibrium are always continuous and diﬀerentiable.
Lemma 4 If there exists (x∗
1,x∗





Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose there exists (x∗
1,x∗





2) = 1/2χ. Consider x′
2 = x∗
2 + ǫ, where ǫ > 0 and x∗
2 < x′
2 < θm. It is easy
to see that π2(x∗
1,x′
2) = (1 − p(x∗
1,x′
2))(χ + ǫ). Moreover, since 1 − p(x∗
1,x′





2), contradicting that (x∗
1,x∗
2) ∈ NE(G). ￿
Consider again the restricted game ˆ G = [( ˆ Ai,log(πi| ˆ A)); i = 1,2] introduced in the proof of
Theorem 1, and denote NE(ˆ G) the set of psne of ˆ G. Our second result says that every psne of the
hybrid game is also a Nash equilibrium of ˆ G.
Lemma 5 NE(G) ⊆ NE(ˆ G).
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, ∃(x∗
1,x∗
2) ∈ NE(G) such that (x∗
1,x∗
2)  ∈ NE(ˆ G). Then, either
x∗
1 ∈ (θm,1], or x∗
2 ∈ [0,θm) or both. Without loss of generality, suppose x∗
1 > θm. By Lemma 4,










1 + χ). Moreover, since
p(x∗
1,x∗
2) < 1/2 and x∗
2 < x∗
1, it follows that [p(x∗
1,x∗




1] < 0. That is,
π1(x∗
1,x∗





1. First, note that x∗
2 ≤ θ2. Therefore, around the equilibrium, π1(x1,x2) =
p(x1,x2)(x2 −x1 +χ) and π2(x1,x2) = (1−p(x1,x2))(x2 −x1 +χ). Diﬀerentiating πi(x1,x2) with
respect to xi, and taking its value at (x∗
1,x∗

















































− (1 − p(x∗
1,x∗
2)) = 0, (5)
where the right hand side of (4), (respectively, (5)) follows from the ﬁrst order conditions, because
x∗
i is an interior maximum of πi( ,x∗
j). However, assuming that (4) holds, note that (5) cannot be
true. If p(x∗
1,x∗
































substituting this into (4), we have that −1 = 0, a contradiction. ￿
Finally, let’s show that ˆ G has a unique psne. As we will immediately see, the proof exploits
that this game is continuous and concave, with unidimensional strategy sets, which makes relatively
simple to prove that the best reply correspondence is a contraction mapping.
Lemma 6 #NE(ˆ G) = 1.
Proof. For all i  = j, and xj ∈ ˆ Aj, let ri(xj) = {˜ xi ∈ ˆ Ai : ˜ xi ∈ argmaxxi∈ ˆ Ai log(πi| ˆ A(xi,xj))}
denote party i’s best replies to platform xj. The properties of ˆ G ensures that ri(xj) is a singleton.
Abusing a bit the notation, let us refer to ri( ) as the best reply function of i, and to r( ) =
(r1( ),r2( )) as the best reply mapping of ˆ G, understanding that, for each (x1,x2) ∈ ˆ A, r(x1,x2) =
r1(x2) × r2(x1).
We want to prove that r( ) is a contraction mapping. That is, we want to show that r( ) has
a unique ﬁxed point, which is also the unique psne of ˆ G. Since ˆ Ai is a closed and convex subset
of real line, a suﬃcient condition for r( ) to be a contraction is, (Vives [29], pp. 47), ∀i  = j, and
∀(xi,xj) ∈ ˆ A,





   
∂2 log(πi| ˆ A(xi,xj))
∂xi∂xj
 
    < 0. (6)
Moreover, since for every pair (x1,x2) ∈ ˆ A, we have that r1(x2) ≥ θ1 and r2(x1) ≤ θ2, we can
restrict our attention to the subset of strategy proﬁles in [θ1,θm] × [θm,θ2].
Let us now check that log(π1| ˆ A) satisﬁes (6).23 Note ﬁrst that









[ψ(x1,x2;θ1) + χ]2, (7)
and







[ψ(x1,x2;θ1) + χ]2. (8)






∂x1∂x2 . Hence, if (8) is negative,
(6) becomes −2/[ψ(x1,x2;θ1) + χ]2, which is obviously smaller than zero. Alternatively, if (8)
23The argument for log(π2| ˆ A) is similar.




, which is also negative by A6. Repeating the
reasoning for party 2’s payoﬀ, it follows that r( ) is a contraction. Therefore, it has a unique ﬁxed
point. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. Immediate from Lemmas 5 and 6. ￿
4 Mixed strategy analysis
Assume now parties are allowed to randomize over campaign platforms. For each party i = 1,2,
let ∆(Ai) be the space of all (Borel) probability measures on Ai = [0,1], and denote ∆(A) =
∆(A1) × ∆(A2). A mixed strategy for i is a probability measure  i ∈ ∆(Ai). As usual, we say
that  i has support supp( i) ⊆ Ai if party i assigns probability one over the set supp( i) under  i,
and we indicate by A( i) = {x ∈ [0,1] :  i({x}) > 0} the set of atoms of  i. In what follows, we
endow ∆(Ai) with the topology of weak convergence. That is, we say that a sequence of measures
{ n







Since the discontinuities of parties’ payoﬀs is the major obstacle to prove the existence of a
psne in G, before continuing it is necessary to show that each πi is a Borel measurable function
on A, so that it makes sense to talk about mixed strategies and the expected value of πi under
  = ( 1, 2) ∈ ∆(A). Observe that this cannot be guaranteed by invoking neither continuity nor
semi-continuity of the payoﬀs. As we showed in Example 1, both conditions are violated in the
hybrid election game.
Let (A,B(A), ) be a Borel probability space, where B(A) is a Borel σ-algebra on A and   :
B(A) → R+ a probability measure on B(A). A real valued function z : A → R is measurable with
respect to B(A) if, for all α ∈ R, {x ∈ A : z(x) < α} ∈ B(A).
Lemma 7 For each i = 1,2, πi : A → R is Borel measurable on A.
Proof. We prove the lemma for π1. The argument for π2 is identical. For all (x1,x2) ∈ A, let
π∗
1(x1,x2) = [1− H(1/2 −F(S(x1,x2))](ψ(x1,x2;θ1)+ χ1). By continuity, π∗
1 is measurable on A.
Let D(A) = {(x1,x2) ∈ A : x1 = x2  = θm}. Clearly, {(x1,x2) ∈ A : π1(x1,x2)  = π∗
1(x1,x2)} =
D(A). Hence, since  (D(A)) = 0, π1 and π∗
1 are equivalent with respect to  ; and, therefore, π1 is
Borel measurable on A, because a function equivalent to a measurable function is itself measurable
(Kolmogorov and Fomin [19], pp. 289). ￿
Now we complete the description of the mixed extension, extending parties’ payoﬀs to the
domain of mixed strategies. That is, for each i = 1,2, we deﬁne the expected payoﬀ on ∆(A) as
Ui( 1, 2) =
 
A πi(x)d( 1, 2), where ∀i,  i ∈ ∆(Ai). Observe that Ui : ∆(A) → R is well deﬁned,
because any Borel measurable function on A is measurable in the associated product measure
space.24
Deﬁnition 5 A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G = [(Ai,πi);i = 1,2] is a pair of probabil-
ity measures ( ∗
1, ∗
2) ∈ ∆(A) such that, for all ( 1, 2) ∈ ∆(A), U1( ∗
1, ∗




2) ≥ U2( ∗
1, 2).
24Recall that πi( ) is bounded, because p( ) and ψ(  ;θ
i) are bounded on A. Therefore, by Lemma 7, πi( ) is
 -integrable and its expected value is well deﬁned.
17That is, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of G is a Nash equilibrium of the mixed extension
G = [(∆(Ai),Ui);i = 1,2]. We denote ME(G) the set of all such equilibria. To prove that ME(G)
is nonempty is not a trivial matter, because G is an inﬁnite action game with discontinuous payoﬀs.
To solve this problem, we use Reny [24], according to which a (compact and Hausdorﬀ) game
possesses a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if its mixed extension satisﬁes a condition called better
reply security. This condition is deﬁned as follows. Let U : ∆(A) → R2 be the mixed extension’s
vector payoﬀ function, so that for all   ∈ ∆(A), U( ) = (U1( ),U2( )):25
Deﬁnition 6 G = [(∆(Ai),Ui);i = 1,2] is better reply secure if for any ( ∗,U∗) ∈ cl(gr(U)) such
that  ∗  ∈ ME(G), there exists a party, say i, who can secure a payoﬀ strictly above U∗
i at  ∗.26
Proposition 3 G is better reply secure.
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that there exists ( ∗,U∗) ∈ cl(gr(U)) such that  ∗  ∈ ME(G)
and no party i = 1,2 can secure a payoﬀ strictly above U∗
i at  ∗. This is equivalent to say that, for
all i, all  i ∈ ∆(Ai), and all δ > 0, ∃  −i(δ) such that   −i(δ)− ∗
−i  < δ and Ui( i, −i(δ)) ≤ U∗
i ,
where       denotes the norm in ∆(A). We disprove this claim as follows:
Step 1. There is a party, say 1, and a strategy ˆ  1 ∈ ∆(A1), such that U1(ˆ  1, ∗
2) > U1( ∗
1, ∗
2);
Step 2. There exists a proposal x1 ∈ A1 either, in the support of ˆ  1, or “close enough” to a
platform in supp(ˆ  1), such that x1 is not an atom of  ∗
2 and U1(x1, ∗
2) > U1( ∗
1, ∗
2);
Step 3. By continuity of U1(x1,  ) in  2 at  ∗
2, party 1 can secure a payoﬀ U1(x1, ∗
2) strictly
greater than U1( ∗
1, ∗
2);
Step 4. Repeating the argument behind Step 2 and 3, party 2 can secure a payoﬀ U2( ∗
1,x2)
greater than or equal to U2( ∗
1, ∗
2);
Step 5. By Steps 3 and 4, U∗
1 + U∗
2 > U1( ∗
1, ∗
2) + U2( ∗
1, ∗
2);
Step 6. Finally, despite of the discontinuities of Π = π1 + π2 on D(A), for every sequence
{ n} ⊂ ∆(A) that converges to  ∗, lim n→ ∗
 
A Π(x)d n converges to
 
A Π(x)d ∗, which stands
in contradiction with Step 5.
Now we oﬀer more details for each of the previous steps. As it will become immediately clear,
the crucial one is Step 2. Together with Step 3, it roughly says that party 1’s proﬁtable deviation
from ( ∗
1, ∗
2) cannot be undercut by party 2, by displacing a slightly amount of probability mass.
The structure of the game ensures that party 1 can always protect his deviation payoﬀ from this
undermining behavior.
Step 1. Trivial. Since the strategy proﬁle  ∗ is not a mixed strategy equilibrium, without loss
of generality we can assume that ∃ ˆ  1 ∈ ∆(A1) such that
U1(ˆ  1, ∗
2) > U1( ∗
1, ∗
2). (9)
Step 2. Consider a platform ˆ x1 ∈ supp(ˆ  1) such that U1(ˆ x1, ∗
2) > U1( ∗
1, ∗
2). That proposal
always exists. On the contrary, suppose that ∀x1 ∈ supp(ˆ  1), U1(x1, ∗
2) ≤ U1( ∗
1, ∗
2). Integrating
25The graph of U and its closure are deﬁned as before.
26As before, party i can secure a payoﬀ α ∈ R at   ∈ ∆(A) if there exists ¯  i ∈ ∆(Ai) such that, for all  
′
−i in some
open neighborhood of  −i, Ui(¯  i, 
′
−i) ≥ α.
18with respect to ˆ  1, we have that
 
A1 U1(x1, ∗
2)dˆ  1 = U1(ˆ  1, ∗







which contradicts (9). Therefore, if ˆ x1  ∈ A( ∗
2), we are done. Otherwise, we proceed as follows.
Without loss of generality, suppose θ1 < θm. Consider a platform x1 ∈ A1 close enough to ˆ x1,
such that x1  ∈ A( ∗
2) and
U1(x1, ∗
2) ≥ U1(ˆ x1, ∗
2). (10)
Since  ∗
2 is a probability measure and it has at most countably many atoms, we show next that
such a x1 always exists. To ﬁx the notation, let ˆ x2 = ˆ x1. By the argument behind Lemma 2, for
δ > 0 suﬃciently small, there exists x1 = ˆ x1+δ such that ∀x′
2 ∈ Bδ(ˆ x2), π1(x1,x′
2) > π1(ˆ x1, ˆ x2). In-
tegrating with respect to  ∗
2 over Bδ(ˆ x2), we have
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Therefore, as δ → 0,
 
Bδ(ˆ x2) π1(ˆ x1,x2)d ∗
2 → 1
2 χ1  ∗
2(ˆ x2), because the last two terms in the
right hand side of (11) are areas behind two continuous functions, computed over an interval that









Let’s see now what happens with these integrals over Bc
δ(ˆ x2) = A2 − Bδ(ˆ x2). In order to











ˆ x1 − δ x1 = ˆ x1 + δ ˆ x1 1
1
ˆ x2 − δ
ˆ x2




Figure 4: What’s going on over Bc
δ(ˆ x2)?
The argument behind (13) is as follows. First, note that for every x2 ∈ Bc
δ(ˆ x2), π1( ,x2) is
continuous in x1 at ˆ x1. In other words, given a x2 ∈ Bc
δ(ˆ x2), ∀ǫ > 0, ∃λǫ(x2) > 0 such that,
∀x1 ∈ Bλǫ(x2)(ˆ x1), π1(x1,x2) > π1(ˆ x1,x2) − ǫ. Fix ǫ > 0 and let λǫ = inf{λǫ(x2) : x2 ∈ Bc
δ(ˆ x2)}.
Then, for all x1 ∈ Bλǫ(ˆ x1), and all x2 ∈ Bc
δ(ˆ x2), π1(x1,x2) > π1(ˆ x1,x2) − ǫ. Taking any x1 ∈
Bλǫ(ˆ x1) and integrating with respect to  ∗
2 over Bc
δ(ˆ x2), we have that
 
Bc




δ(ˆ x2) (π1(ˆ x1,x2) − ǫ) d ∗
2. However, for ǫ suﬃciently small,
 
Bc
δ(ˆ x2) ǫd ∗











If δ ≤ λǫ, we are done, because (14) holds for any x1 ∈ Bλǫ(ˆ x1). In particular, for x1 = ˆ x1+δ.27
Therefore, (12) and (13) would imply (10). Otherwise, if δ > λǫ, then we take as we illustrate in
Figure 5 a proposal x′
1 in the interval (ˆ x1, ˆ x1 +λǫ), with the proviso that x′
1  ∈ A( ∗
2). Again, since
 ∗
2 has at most countably many atoms, this alternative exists. Let δ′ = d(x′
1, ˆ x1). Using the same
argument behind (12), it follows that
27Recall that ˆ x2 + δ ∈ B
c
δ(ˆ x2), so that π1(¯ x1, ) may jump at ˆ x2 + δ. However, x1  ∈ A( 
∗
2); i.e.,  
∗
2 assigns zero






































2(ˆ x2 + δ′).
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Figure 5: What’s going on over Γ?
However, as δ → 0, δ and δ′ become arbitrarily close to each other. Therefore, since x′
1  ∈
A( ∗
2) (i.e.  ∗
2(ˆ x2 + δ′) = 0) and π1(x′
1,  ) is continuous in x2 over (ˆ x2 − δ, ˆ x2 − δ′] and over
(ˆ x2 + δ′, ˆ x2 + δ), respectively, the area behind π1(x′
1,x2) on Γ is negligible. A similar argument
implies that
 
Γ π1(ˆ x1,x2)d ∗
2 can also be ignored. Therefore, for δ suﬃciently small, (15) and (16)
imply that U1(x′
1, ∗
2) ≥ U1(ˆ x1, ∗
2).
In short, by proposing ˆ x1 itself or, if ˆ x1 ∈ A( ∗
2), by moving closer to ˆ x1 and choosing either x1
or x′
1, the previous analysis shows that party 1 has a platform in his strategy set that it is not an
atom of  ∗
2, and that oﬀers him an expected payoﬀ strictly greater than U1( ∗
1, ∗
2). Next we prove
that this payoﬀ can also be secured.
Step 3. To simplify the exposition, let us generically refer to the platform of Step 2 as x1,
understanding that this is the proposal which oﬀers to party 1 a payoﬀ strictly above U1( ∗
1, ∗
2)
and x1  ∈ A( ∗
2). Then, U1(x1,  ) is continuous in  2 at  ∗
2. That is, for all ǫ > 0, there exists
δǫ > 0 such that U1(x1, ˜  2) > U1(x1, ∗
2) − ǫ for all ˜  2 such that  ˜  2 −  ∗
2  < δǫ. Therefore, for ǫ
small enough, party 1 can secure U1(x1, ∗
2). That is, there is a strategy, x1, and δ > 0, such that
U1(x1, ˜  2) ≥ U1(x1, ∗
2) for all ˜  2 such that  ˜  2 −  ∗
2  < δ.
21Step 4. Consider a platform x2 ∈ supp( ∗
2) such that U2( ∗
1,x2) ≥ U2( ∗
1, ∗
2). Clearly, x2
always exists. Moreover, using the same argument behind Step 2, it follows that either x2  ∈ A( ∗
1)
or, if x2 ∈ A( ∗
1), then there exists a proposal x2 ∈ A2 close enough to x2 such that U2( ∗
1,x2) ≥
U2( ∗
1,x2) and x2  ∈ A( ∗
1). Hence, invoking continuity of U2( ,x2) in  1 at  ∗
1, (as we did in Step 3
for party 1), we have that party 2 can secure a payoﬀ U2( ∗
1,x2) greater than or equal to U2( ∗
1, ∗
2).
Step 5. By Step 3, U1( ∗
1, ∗
2) < U∗
1. Otherwise, if U∗
1 ≤ U1( ∗
1, ∗
2), then party 1 would be
able to secure a payoﬀ strictly greater than U∗
1, contradicting the initial hypothesis. Similarly, by





2 > U1( ∗
1, ∗
2) + U2( ∗
1, ∗
2).
Step 6. Since we have assumed that ( ∗,U∗) ∈ cl(gr(U)), there exists a sequence { n} ⊂ ∆(A)
such that  n →  ∗, and lim n→ ∗
  
A (π1(x1,x2) + π2(x1,x2)) d n 
= U∗
1+U∗
2.28 Using Π = π1+π2































However, Π is continuous on A − D(A) and, for all i = 1,2, χi ∈ R+. Hence, by weak
convergence, both the lhs and the rhs of (18) tends to zero, a contradiction. Therefore, G is better
reply secure. ￿
Now, we present the main result of the paper:
Theorem 2 The two-party hybrid electoral competition game has a mixed strategy Nash equilib-
rium; i.e., ME(G)  = ∅.
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 3 and Corollary 5.2 in Reny [24]. ￿
Comparing our result in Theorem 2 with Ball [4], there are two main diﬀerences to point out.
First, in our model the probability of winning the election is endogenously derived, from parties’
uncertainty about voters’ preferences, instead of being given by an exogenous function. This is
important because the properties required to ensure the existence of a msne are not imposed on
that function, but on more fundamental primitives of the model. In addition, by explicitly modeling
the electoral uncertainty, it is also possible to get a better understanding of the election game, which
allowed us for example to prove in Section 3.3 the existence and uniqueness of a psne when parties’
motivations are homogeneous.
On the other hand, our existence analysis is based on Reny’s better reply security. Instead,
Ball [4] relies on Dasgupta and Maskin [7], (namely, on Theorem 5b). In this regard, it is worth
noting that better reply security is virtually an ordinal property, (Reny [24], pp. 1034), in the sense
that, if gi : R → R is continuous and strictly increasing for every i, then [(∆(Ai),Ui); i = 1,2] is
better reply secure if and only if [(∆(Ai),gi ◦ Ui); i = 1,2] is. So, the results in Proposition 3 and
Theorem 2 hold for every continuous and strictly monotone transformation of parties’ payoﬀs. In
particular, they can be extended to the alternative speciﬁcation of the mma discussed in Section 2.
28Since Ai is compact and πi is bounded, the sequence {
 
A Π(x)d 
n} always converges when  
n →  
∗. Thus,






This paper analyzes a traditional unidimensional, two-party electoral competition game with elec-
toral uncertainty. The novelty is that, instead of assuming that parties have a single and homo-
geneous motive, as it is usually the case in the existent literature, we suppose that they may be
distinctly concerned with both, winning the election, and the policy implemented after the contest.
The main results obtained from this departure are as follows.
Firstly, in contrast with the standard election game with ideological parties, the payoﬀ functions
of the hybrid game are shown to be neither continuous nor semi-continuous on the strategy space
(Example 1). Moreover, conditional payoﬀs might also violate quasi-concavity (Example 2). Thus,
in spite of being payoﬀ secure (Lemma 2) and reciprocally upper semi-continuous (Lemma 3), the
hybrid election game does not always possess a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In fact, its existence
is guaranteed only if political parties have homogenous interest in power (Theorem 1), in which
case the equilibrium is also unique (Proposition 2).
Secondly, to deal with the case of heterogeneous motives, we prove that the mixed extension of
the hybrid electoral competition game satisﬁes better reply security for all parametric conditions
(Proposition 3). Thus, using Reny [24], we show that a Nash equilibrium always exists (Theorem
2), though it may be one in mixed strategies. This result extends Ball [4] to the case where
the probability of winning function is endogenously derived. And, together with Theorem 1, it
generalizes previous existence results in unidimensional electoral competition.
Finally, the analysis of the uniform distribution case carried out in Section 3.2 also suggests
that, when parties have mixed and probably heterogeneous interests in power, the interaction of
four variables shape equilibrium outcomes. These variables are the electoral uncertainty, parties’
ideology, the aggregate opportunism and its distribution across parties. Depending on the values
of these parameters, we might have a psne or a msne. Moreover, Saporiti [28] has showed that
we might end up with both parties proposing platforms at the median position (i.e., with full
convergence); with each one playing in its own ideological arena (i.e., with policy divergence); or
with both on the same side of the political spectrum.29
In particular, when the opportunism is large compared with the electoral uncertainty, and
asymmetrically distributed, the support of each msne is a closed interval located on one side of
the median voter’s ideal point, and is the same for both candidates. Probability distributions are
atomless in the interior of this set, and concentrate on the support’s end points as uncertainty
increases. Equilibria in mixed strategies vanish above a critical level of uncertainty, beyond which
each party plays a pure strategy in its ideological side (Saporiti [28]).
Of course, these results stand in sharp contrast with the standard prediction of the Downsian
game where, regardless of the level of electoral uncertainty, both parties locate at the median
ideal policy. They substantially diﬀer from Wittman equilibria too, because in that case parties’
ideologies constitute the main driven force of electoral outcomes. It is left for a future work to
explore the validity of these ﬁndings in more general models of electoral competition.
29Some of these predictions resemble Mitchell [21].
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